Walaupun berhasil mendapatkan suara terbanyak di Jakarta pada pemilihan umum tahun 2004, PKS nampak sulit untuk mewujudkan keuntungan politik tersebut dan mendapatkan kekuasaan eksekutif dengan memenangkan pemilihan kepala daerah di Jakarta. Setelah kekalahan dengan selisih yang relatif tipis pada pemilihan kepala daerah tahun 2007, kandidat dari partai tersebut juga gagal untuk bersaing dengan kandidat lain di putaran kedua pada pemilihan kepala daerah berikutnya. Dengan menerapkan beberapa teori yang menjelaskan kandidat bekerja di pemilihan lokal, tulisan ini mendiskusikan beberapa kemungkinan penjelasan mengenai kegagalan Hidayat Nur Wahid, kandidat dari PKS, pada pemilihan kepala daerah di Jakarta pada tahun 2012. Tulisan ini berpendapat bahwa walaupun ada kemungkinan faktor agama, dalam hal ini Islam, bekerja di dalamnya, bukanlah kandidat dari partai Islam seperti PKS yang terdepan dalam memanfaatkannya mengingat ada faktor lain yang juga bekerja seperti karakter pribadi, sumber politik dan faktor media. Dalam kasus ini, kegagalan untuk menawarkan kandidat dengan kemampuan untuk mengatasi masalah-masalah perkotaan merupakan faktor yang membuat pemilih perkotaan untuk cenderung tidak berada pada pihak kandidat dari partai Islam, walaupun mereka memiliki kesamaan identitas relijius.
political resources and media are playing role in this context. In this case, the failure to offer a candidate with the capacity to tackle urban problems makes urban voters unlikely to be on their side, although they share the similar religious identity.
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IN T RODUCT ION
In the study of urban politics, the analysis of Islamist's involvement in city electoral process is relatively rare, leaving mostly on the cases of Turkish RP (Refah Partisi -Welfare Party) and AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-Justice and Development Party) and Lebanese Hezbollah. The rarity is surely understandable since democratic process, a possible arena for Islamic political organizations or movements to compete is hardly found in majority of Islamic countries in the region. Only following the recent uprising in the Middle East have more opportunities existed for increasingly competitive elections. However, it will take more time, years if not decades, to develop stable and consolidated democracy and transfer it to local level. The political changing in several Middle Eastern countries known as the Arab Spring has offered a little to provide competitive political arena and seeking more cases of Islamists' activism in a local electoral is becoming even more challenging.
In Turkey, there are several studies focusing on the way the 'Islamic movement' positions itself in urban politics. At the social level, the Gülen movement, also known as Hizmet, is one of the major social forces in mobilising religious citizens to penetrate public sphere (e.g. Yavuz 2013; Topal 2013 ) whilst at political level, the RP and AKP dominate the dynamics of urban politics by winning significant numbers of local election in many cities (e.g. Gulalp 1999; Çarkoglu 2009 ). The most influential person in contemporary Turkish politics, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is a product of local politics after securing the governorship of Istanbul in 1994, from where he developed his popularity through impressive leadership in the city of more than ten million residents (Çınar 1997) . Social and anthropological studies have investigated the growing influence of the RP and AKP perceived to have the Islamic background. They also investigated the ability to be part of daily life expression in urban areas (White 2005) , representing and helping lowerincome citizens in squatter areas (Yalcintan and Erbas 2003, 100-101) ; and combining with increasing number of middle class with more religious character (Insel 2003; Yavuz 2006) as the contributing factors of their increasing popularity. Those aspects are significant in the increasing political support to the RP, until its closure in 1998, and the AKP from 2002 until recently, at least in maintaining power through electoral triumph.
A number of studies on Muslim activism in local context has been conducted by scholars. However, only a few countries have been mentioned in the urban political studies in Islamist activism. Bayat's studies (1996 Bayat's studies ( , 2005 Bayat's studies ( , & 2007 proposed the term post-Islamism to bring additional social aspects of urban Muslim's life where new forms of Islamism grow. In this term, Islamism is all about social expression, not necessarily politics, of Muslims in big cities referring to the growing role of open and public space in Iran, especially Tehran, with some aspects of the rising of Islamic influence at a social level in urban areas in Egypt. Another study conducted by Ismail (2000) focuses on the Islamic activism in the urban setting of Cairo. Nevertheless, the activists studied in the article are challenging the local government outside the system and considering applying violent approach rather than getting involved in formal local party politics and elections. Thus with only limited opportunity for free and competitive election in urban areas in the region, the possibility of examining the involvement of Islamic movement is relatively limited. However, it is remarkable to see rare studies of Islamist political activities in unlikely place such as Saudi and Israel cities. In Saudi Arabia, Kraetzschmar (2010) is able to capture the Islamist success in mobilizing urban votes whereas, in Israel, Peled (2001) sees how the Islamist movement spreads its influence at Israel's municipal as well as national levels.
Despite Indonesia's relatively minor position in the study of Muslims in general, with its new democratic regime, it offers more opportunity in looking for Islamic movements or organizations competing in more regular and stable electoral process. The opportunity only came nearly two decades ago in 1998 when Soeharto stepped down after 32 years in power. Indonesia then entered the Reform Era and since then it has strived to develop a more open political landscape by embracing democracy in spite of the fact that it has to encounter several major obstacles (King 2003) . It is now categorized as a free country in Freedom House index to replace Thailand and Malaysia that have been previously categorised as free country in Southeast Asia. In local areas, it brought significant changes when the amended constitution and new laws require a direct election at every local level of province, city, and regency (Antlov 2002) . Despite all suspicious flaws indicated by scholars (Mietzner & Aspinall 2010, 5-8) , every level of local elections now has at least two electoral events directly electing a governor and mayor or regent to win the executive positions by popular votes. Therefore, the local elections are still competitive for the parties and candidates.
Hence, Indonesian local elections now become an excellent place for examining the dynamic of Islamic parties in urban politics, especially in city elections, as the country has experienced regular elections at the local level for almost two decades. Among five Islamic or Muslim based parties, the PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera -Prosperous Justice Party) captured more attention as it succeeded to garner 23 percent of votes in the capital Jakarta and became the most popular party in the 2004 general election in the capital city. The party mostly supported by young Muslim activists in major urban areas was established following the fall of the authoritarian regime. Categorically, the PKS represents Islamist movements in Indonesia (Hasan 2012) and for the party, the achievement should be materialized into local political success by winning the gubernatorial position. However, the mission failed at the gubernatorial election in 2007 although its candidate gained 44% of votes as the rest of 19 parties united to support their sole candidate (Woodward 2008) . After losing the 2007 Jakarta election with a relatively narrow gap, the party has recorded a number of setbacks in elections in the capital, either at local or national level. Its candidate in the 2012 election only secured 11 percent and failed to proceed to second round; this was way below its 19 percent in the 2009 national election. It marked the failure to either transform its previous success or at least maintain its popular support in the national elections as it dropped to third place in 2014 national election with only 11 percent of votes. Therefore, there is a significant circumstance to look at the PKS's performance in the capital as it gradually loses supporters from one election to another. This paper aims to look at the performance of the PKS in the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election to represent the challenges confronted by Islamist party in relatively competitive urban politics with predominantly Muslim voters. The party is a good case to be examined due to its achievement in becoming the most popular party in the 2004 general election in Jakarta and its garnering 42 percent of the votes for its gubernatorial candidate in 2007. With these achievements, there was optimism among party members that it would have good performance in the 2012 gubernatorial election as well. At least, it should have been able to maintain its 19 percent of the votes at 2009 national election. However, despite its potency to seize or at least be competitive for this strategic position, the party's candidate failed to attract adequate votes in Jakarta even to qualify for the second round. In general picture, the investigation on how the party's candidate strived to position and campaign in front of the public for a local election can reveal the problematic nature of an Islamic party in the democratic process. By looking at its 2012 candidacy in a bid to win the local election, this paper argues that religious identity is not a guarantee for an Islamic party to convince the majority of Muslim voters in the capital whose Muslim population is around 85 percent. Consequently, other factors that also influence the voters inside the ballot box in the context of local urban politics must be taken into account accordingly. Miichi (2014) suggests the importance of religion in the Jakarta's gubernatorial election where the two pairs going through the second round had strived to carefully manage their ties to Islam at different degrees. However, applying his argument to a party that is already Islamic seems peculiar as it sees Islam as a trump card for its magnitude of performance in the local election.
What are other voting-related elements that could be influential factors in the local urban elections? Examining local elections using behavioral approach is one of the major methods of studying urban politics since the 1960s. Although new paradigms such as neo-Marxists' urban protest dimension and international dimension of economic force to the electoral process have been developed significantly, the behavioral approach has still survived alongside rational choice theory and discourse analysis (Stoker 1998) .
Despite its prolonged research, the behavioral study of the local election is still underdeveloped compared to the national level. Although there are already several studies and data collection that have been conducted by political scientists (Marschall, Shah & Ruhil 2011, 1) , the situation since the 1960s and 1970s remains unchanged until recently (Stoker 1998, 127) . In the context of Indonesia, most of the studies are focusing on political process on how candidates organized and arranged their campaign strategies in relation to the consolidation of democracy (Buehler 2009 ). In particular, they are focusing on how democracy works in a local election in relation to the dynamics of party politics (Choi 2004 (Choi , 2005 . Both are using a qualitative approach to explore the dynamics of a personal network and the role of the political party in the elections of Riau, Yogyakarta, and Toraja. Their research reveals that the personality of candidates is important to win a local election. However, at the same time, a political party also plays a great role. The degree of both personal and institutional is different though, depending on the area where the election takes place. The research conducted by Buehler (2009) in Toraja, South Sulawesi finds that an area dominated by agricultural and rural cultures still holds admiration at a certain level to aristocracy and tends to undermine the role of an institution such as a political party. However, Indonesian politics at the elite level is also marked by the willingness of a political party to influence the political process in a local election. This finding is confirmed in Choi's research in Riau and Yogyakarta. However, despite the eagerness of local party elites to influence the local politics, the research using quantitative approach shows that the final decision is at the hand of the voters. Mujani and Liddle (2012) , for example, confirm this conclusion that the voters are keener to have greater space to evaluate the contestants in an election, although their research is based on the general election. Nevertheless, in many cases, including Indonesia, local elections do not always replicate what the party or candidate has achieved at the national level. As the local elections are designed to choose individuals or pairs to secure executive positions, candidacy becomes an additional factor besides party itself. Hence, focusing on the importance of candidate for the voters is more important.
In the discussion of local elections, several studies confirm the importance of candidate in the eye of voters. Many believe that in local election candidate is more significant to attract voters to represent them in the national parliament. This underlines the difference between local and national elections in term of the role of candidate. In the British case, it is revealed that the personal aspects of candidate only have a modest influence on his or her votes in the national election (Norris, Vallance, & Lovenduski 2002) . Another study in Canada also confirms that local candidate only influences an insignificant number of Canadian voters (Blais 2003) , but again it is based on the election for national representation. Different from the national or federal election, in elections for local chief executive such as governor, mayor, or regent, the candidate's credentials are far more essential. In the US experience, for instance, a candidate for governor may have to struggle to raise funds and to develop a network of volunteers to help in or with the campaign. A political party is not playing a great role and sometimes leaves candidates of the same party to compete in the same local election.
In the context of Indonesia, only very few studies, if any, investigate factors that influence voters in choosing a candidate during a campaign. Hence, to initiate the study of how a candidate wins local election this study uses analyses that have been discussed in other local election in a more advanced democracy. One of the handful efforts to summarise possible factors of how a candidate in local election wins is conducted by Lieske (1989) (Lieske 1989, 153) . This paper will discuss these three factors to find the possible explanation of the PKS declining popularity in Jakarta.
R ESE A RCH MET HOD
To support the argument, this article looks into data related to factors for urban candidacy in a local election. Three factors are explored in this article as they are likely to play a role in the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 2012 and all data are obtained from secondary sources that are available in many sources from previous reports, scientific articles, as well as news in media. However, not all data are available in these written sources. To analyze the tendency of candidates in relation to media and public, their campaign media on the internet, as well as the presence of each candidate in one of the internet search engines, are explored. In general, this method is located within a qualitative method and more specifically, case study as it aims at elaborating a specific topic in a case. Consequently, there will be no general conclusion that can be generated from the case in 2012 as it has different contexts and complexities when compared to other gubernatorial elections in the capital. However, this case study may offer a distinct proposition for further discussion on urban local candidacy.
T HE PK S A ND ELECT IONS IN INDONESI A
The PKS is an Islamic party that was established in 2002 as a continuation of the PK following the fall of Soeharto and his New Order regime in 1998. The PK was established immediately after the opportunity was available by the new government but failed to pass the electoral threshold after gaining only 1.8 percent of votes in the 1999 general election. Consequently, it had to change into the PKS in order to be able to participate in the next election. It was part of the new era in Indonesian politics to introduce political reform based on democratic principles. The new reformed regime has given opportunities for the ideological party to establish and involve in a competitive political process, especially in an election. After being oppressed by the previous regime, Islam is still the most attractive source of values, other than Pancasila, for the new parties and among 48 contestants for the 1999 elections 12 of them declared Islam as their ideology while another eight aimed Islamic voters as their target (Fatah 1999, 132) . However, only five of them could survive obtaining minimum votes to pass the electoral threshold to secure seats in the parliament. In total these five parties received 37 percent of votes. After five years in politics, there was no significant improvement when their votes were stagnant in the 2004 general election. The performance of Islamic parties was even worse in 2009 as their votes dropped to slightly less than 30 percent (Aspinall 2010, 105-106) , which was seen by some scholars as the decline of Islamic parties in Indonesia's electoral process (Fealy 2009 ) although still have significant influence in political life (Tanuwidjaya 2010) .
Despite the relatively low achievement of Islamic parties in general in the national elections, the PKS has recorded different outcomes. First, in the 2004 election, the party significantly increased its votes from 1.6 to 7.34 percent. Second, it performed well in several big cities when it became the most popular party in Bogor, Bekasi, Bandung, Medan, and the capital Jakarta. It is believed that the success was part of the ability of the party to capitalize on the demand to have a better Indonesia. At that time this was a general feeling among many voters after the reform era and the hope was expected to be fulfilled by the party's image of 'clean and caring ' (Nurdin 2010, p. 543-544) . This image was attractive enough for many first-time voters as well as the middle class in urban areas who were fed up with corrupted politicians and ineffective bureaucrats. This is one of the explanatory factors of why the party was able to get more votes in big cities rather than rural areas.
After relatively successful electoral participation until 2004, the party has faced a difficult time when its involvement in the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono cabinet brought the party into problematic positions. When dealing with an unpopular policy such as increasing the gasoline price in 2005 for instance, at first the PKS strongly opposed and criticised it, a position admired by the public. However, the PKS finally accepted the policy after having a meeting with the President. Since then, the party seems to have lost its promising image of the reform party. It was not able to repeat the 2004 success in the 2009 general election. The latter election was relatively stagnant where the party lost its position as a popular party in big cities. Only because of its ability to penetrate more regions (provinces) the party could maintain its votes at the level of 7.88 percent (Hidayat 2009). The stagnation of the PKS was also partly due to the corruption scandals allegedly involving some of its prominent figures as mentioned before (Aspinall 2010, 106) , an opposite image of the party's commitment to the jargon of 'clean party.' This image seems to fall completely when its president, Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq, and one of its governors, Gatot Pujo Nugroho, was taken into custody by KPK (Corruption Eradication Commission) in 2014 and 2015 and put on trial for graft and bribery. The first was related to raw beef import allocations and the case was opened by the Commission only weeks before the 2014 national election. While this case was strongly rejected by most of the party cadres, toward the second, the cadres were relatively calm accepting the fact that religion and the jargon of 'clean party' cannot guarantee its party elites not to commit immoral and unlawful behavior while in office .
The decline of its popularity in big cities can be seen at the PKS's performance in the local elections, especially in Jakarta. Following the success in the 2004 election, the party strived to compete in the local elections in the capital. There are two local elections in which the party involved by offering its own candidates, in 2007 and 2012. The local election in 2007 was the first direct election in the capital to choose a governor and vice governor and the PKS nominated Deputy Chief police force, Adang Daradjatun, to compete with former vice-governor, Fauzi Bowo. All parties in the capital supported the latter candidate to impede the PKS possible domination over Jakarta, which is seen as 'a honey pot' (Schonhardt 2012) that control a local budget of almost $22 million at that time. Although the party's candidate was able to attract 44 percent of votes, it was not enough to beat the opponent and the party lost its momentum following its strong legislative election showing.
The second attempt was in the 2012 local election when the party also put forth a candidate for the governorship. The party's performance in two local elections is disappointing considering its popularity in Jakarta after the 2004 general election and the 2007 local election. Other than its popularity, there are also several positive expressions being addressed to the PKS to admire the party's distinctive character. Nakamura (2005), for example, explains that it has the image of hope after its criticism toward corruption and its commitment to social welfare. This image, according to him, has attracted many members of the younger generation in the urban areas, as the party is also associated with the well-educated and the middle class who strongly prefer its non-violent message. Therefore, it also has the image of promising improvement as it is associated with the spirit of reform and transformation in keeping with Islamic values. It is the only Islamic party perceived to be different yet in the same box as 'red parties' as this party offers substantial change (Fatah 1999).
In short, the PKS has been able to transform Islamic values into imagination and activities that can be understood universally by the public. Different from other Islamic parties that clearly symbolize their identities and program as 'Islamic', the party chose to adopt universal values of Islam as their identity. The word Keadilan (Justice) and Sejahtera (Prosperous) refers to Islamic universal goals. The party's approach to Islamic interpretation also follows the moderate, non-violent and social ideology of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.
Although the relationship between achievement in the national and local election is seen as insignificant by scholars, the failure to maintain the party's popularity in Jakarta as reflected in the defeat of two local elections is still noteworthy to be explored. As a city with the predominant population of Muslim and Betawi being the native community associated with the religion, the PKS identity as an Islamic party and universal interpretation of the religion should be beneficial to attract many votes in the elections. The fact that religion played a role in the dynamics of a local election in the capital shows the potency that could be maximised by the party.
However, the 2012 gubernatorial election was held in a relatively gloomy picture of Islamic parties. During the year, there were several surveys examining the popularity of political parties in Indonesia. For Islamic and Muslim based parties, the result of a survey conducted by the Indonesian Circle Survey (LSI) showed that they would only garner 21 percent of votes if the general election were held in September (the Jakarta Posts, 15 October 2012). More strikingly, none of the Islamic or Muslim based parties is in the top five and they would only be voted by less than five percent of respondents. Another survey conducted by National Survey Institute in early October 2012 also indicated the similar trend that the PKS would only receive 4.4 percent of the vote and the support for Islamic and Muslim based parties would be slightly above ten percent (Osman 2012). Although the pre-election survey has several aspects to be debated in term of methodology and the fact that there are a significant number (around 36 percent) of undecided voters, the findings have indicated that Islamic parties are less attractive when the local election in Jakarta was held.
It is then understandable that the PKS nominated Hidayat Nur Wahid to enter the competition in order to reclaim its past glory in Jakarta (the Jakarta Posts, 2 June 2012). He has a good reputation and claims respect among the party's members and Indonesian public after serving as the head of MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat -People's Consultative Assembly in the period of 2004 -2009, although his role was limited only to lead less than ten times of joint meeting between the lower house and Senate. However, despite his respective figure as former head of the Assembly and humble person with a strong background as an intellectual in Islamic studies, his nomination failed to attract significant votes in Jakarta.
After three general elections in Indonesia since its first in 1999, it is revealed that the new tendency of party identification was still relatively significant. On the contrary, the latest election was also marked by the growing of evaluation on political parties after two periods of government under direct president elections (Mujani & Liddle 2012) . Indonesians now have a chance to evaluate the party's performance and the main basis of the assessment is the economic situation that they experience affecting legitimacy of political parties and their candidates in local elections.
DISCUSSING T HE PK S'S CA NDIDAT E IN 2012 JA K A RTA GUBER NATOR I A L EL ECT ION

Ascribed Personal Factor
Lieske clearly mentions that the personal factor is a key in a local election, not in general election to represent a particular region in national level. This is also the case in Jakarta that the electoral supports for a party in the general election do not have a direct relationship with the result for a candidate in the gubernatorial election.
The PKS has been supported by 23 percent of votes in the 2004 election and 18 percent in the 2009 election. In local parliament, or DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or Local People's Representative House), the PKS obtains 18 seats in both 2004 . However, from 2004 to 2009 the local parliament had 75 seats in total and it was expanded to 100 since then. Therefore, the proportion of the party's representation had declined from 24 as the leading party to 18 percent in third place.
However, on many occasions, the party had expressed optimism that its candidate would win the election based on the result of the national election and expected that voters' electoral preference was relatively constant. For the latter, one of the arguments is that in the previous local election, the PKS candidate had garnered 44 percent of votes which would support its candidate again in 2012. The President of the PKS said on one occasion, "Now they are split into six pairs, while the PKS remains unmoved. We will maintain our constituents and win the Jakarta" (Dipa 2012) . His comment was directed to the fact that there are six pairs of candidates for the election and assumed that the 44 percent of votes for Adang Daradjatun, the PKS candidate in 2007, still support the party's candidate in 2012. Another tendency in relation to a local election is calculating the national election votes for local election, vice versa. After the party's member won the North Sumatra local election in March 2013, the new President explained that the province is a miniature of Indonesia because of its plurality. 'Winning the province' to get gubernatorial position 'is a sign that the PKS is accepted in plural society and in the future, our party will be accepted in more plural society' (Asril 2013) .
In the case of Jakarta gubernatorial election, it is clear that candidate is the main source of voters' choice in the ballot box, not the party. The table below confirms the assumption that political party is not the factor for a candidate to win the local election in gubernatorial position.
The table below clearly reveals that party identification in Jakarta is relatively weak, which confirms the findings of Mujani and Liddle's research after the 2009 national election. The favorite candidate and incumbent, Fauzi Bowo, had a wide range of support with the PD as his major party combining with two Muslim based parties, the PKB and PAN. If party identification worked and Jakartans followed the political line of those parties, he should have received approximately 42 percent of votes. In fact, he was only supported by 34.05 percent, 8 percent less. The case of the first round winner, Joko Widodo, is more convincing in this context because the voters are not completely in parallel with the political party's stance. While he was only supported by the PDIP and Gerindra with only 15.9 percent of votes in the 2009 general election in Jakarta, he could gain more than 46 percent three years later. Therefore, demonstration that party identification is difficult to find in local election may be seen in the 2012 Jakarta gubernatorial election. For many spectators, this phenomenon is perceived as a positive sign that rationality is growing among the voters to abandon ascribed identity of the candidates as an important electoral factor and seek for a better candidate to lead Jakarta (Basuki 2012). This is also confirmed by the fact that the legitimacy some candidates wanted to develop had also failed to work effectively. Fauzi Bowo and his vice governor candidate, Nachrowi Ramli, are Betawi, the native people of Jakarta who are then perceived by the Betawis as a legitimate candidate to lead the capital. Based on this, Fauzi Bowo deliberately maximised the image of being a native that is also associated with Islam to attract other non-native
Muslims. In a cosmopolitan city of Jakarta, this strategy to represent Betawi identity may have displeased other ethnic groups (Sukarsono 2012) . Hidayat Nur Wahid also had a similar strategy in maximising the identification with people of Jakarta. If the incumbent maximised ethnic identity and religion, he and his vice candidate preferred orange as their identical color in combination with Batik motif. Batik is a widely known motive strongly related with Javanese, a dominant ethnic group in Jakarta with around 35.5 percent of the Jakartans. He and his team deliberately chose the color and the motive to attract two different identities at the same time: football supporters and Javanese (in Jakarta, the most popular footbal team is identified with orange) and Javanese.
It is quite common in Indonesia that football is often used for political purpose. There are cases that local leaders helped to support a popular football club in their region in order to gain popularity. This strategy also used by the PKS candidate in West Java when Ahmad Heryawan unexpectedly won the governor position by choosing blue as his color during a campaign in 2008. It is not a coincidence that blue is the color of a very popular football club in the province's capital: Persib Bandung. Therefore, depicting a particular color is crucial to develop identification with popular preference. In the case of West Java, this strategy worked at some points, apart from the significant factor of his vice candidate, popular actor Dede Yusuf who was the cadre of the PAN symbolically recognized by blue color.
That is one of the likely reasons of why Wahid did not develop his image with Islam strongly as the voters were assumed to know him as the candidate of an Islamic party. The color of orange is not regarded as the color of Islam that is otherwise characterized by white or green. By choosing the color, it was expected that he and his party were able to penetrate different potential voters who have less association with Islam. It is also a strategy to reduce suspicion that the PKS and its members are are strict Muslims along the lines of the Wahhabism fostered by Saudi Arabia. The term is negatively perceived by even by many Muslims in Indonesia as 'traditionalist' particularly characterized by the idea of the Islamic state of the party (Sukmajati 2011 ).
However, his strategy ran ineffective because other factors and candidates undermined this symbolization. Although football supporters of Persija are significant, the year of 2012 was marked by severe conflict of PSSI, the national football authority, that led to the division of football league, including the most popular club in the capital: Persija. There, enthusiasm toward football activities was insignificant and replaced by condemnation rather than support or admiration. While at the same time, his effort to attract Javanese voters was challenged by the figure of Joko Widodo, a mayor of Solo who can represent Javanese identity as well. Although Wahid did not encourage this ethnic sentiment strongly and Joko Widodo did not take the same strategies as well, the latter position as mayor of Solo significantly undermined Wahid's association with Javanese. Solo is the cultural capital of Javanese in Central Java province, while Klaten, the hometown of Wahid, is only a peripheral town in Javanese ideas. Moreover, such strategy is perceived as conventional and it can be easily overcome by the attractive strategy as practiced by Jokowi. Jokowi and Purnama easily got more attention in this field by using more eye-catching shirt: red-and-white checked shirts. The symbolization of this pattern is more convincing for the voters as it gave the impression of candidates of the people (Fealy 2013, 108) In short, for Jakartans, the ascribed identity of the candidate is neither ethnicity nor religiosity (Basuki 2012). They also have loose loyalty to a political party when they have to choose a person to tackle the daily life of Jakarta and manage its problems. Religiosity for Indonesian, in general, is embraced in moderate interpretation and every Muslim does not have any obligation to follow her/his religion's teaching when it comes to political aspiration. The position is taken by two major Islamic social organizations of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah which then become the stumbling block of any Islamic party to penetrate Muslims in Indonesian because the majority of them, or 75 percent, describe themselves as having an association with those two organisations, whether active or passive (Mujani 2004) .
Achieved Personal Factor
Another personal character that is relevant to influence voters is the achievement that is what a candidate has achieved in her/his education or occupation. In this aspect, Wahid and his vice candidate have significant benefits since they hold doctorate degrees in Islamic studies and economics. Wahid spent his school in pesantren, an Islamic boarding school, before he flew to Madinah for his doctorate degree. His vice candidate is known as an academic who holds doctorate degree from a university in the Philippines. Before serving as a lawmaker from 2004 to 2009 with the PAN, he taught in several universities and became a respectable economic analyst. No other candidates have similar credibility in term of achievement in education, except Fauzi Bowo.
Wahid is also nationally known as a respectable politician from the PKS. Following the success to increase seats in parliament in 2004, the PKS was able to grab the position of head of People's Consultative Assembly, a joint institution of House of Representatives and DPD (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah -Regional Representative Council) a US Senate-like institution. During his leadership, he showed to the public that he was a humble person who was willing to refuse state facilities (Kompas, 14 October 2004). The public had praised his attitude, as it was an unusual behavior of politicians in Indonesian political life. He was also the candidate for House of Representative who received enough votes to claim his seat from Central Java in the parliament directly in the 2004 national election. In the election, candidates for the House had to gained minimum of BPP (Bilangan Pembagi Pemilih or known in single transferable vote system as Hare quota) to get the seat without depending on transfer of vote from other candidates from similar party in the same district. Only two lawmakers (the other lawmaker is Saleh Djasit) in the parliament who were able to have similar performance and he was one of them.By having those achievements and records, the party was hoping that it could attract the middle class in Jakarta because it offered well-educated candidates. In addition, the PKS was also aware that it had to win the Jakarta election to boost its confidence in preparation of national election in 2014. Winning the capital is a strategic political benefit that may deliver the party to become a major political player in Indonesian politics. After unproductive negotiations with other possible candidates before the PKS announced Wahid's candidacy, the party strived hard to find agreement with Fauzi Bowo to accept the party's member as his vice gubernatorial candidate. Failing that, the PKS had to embrace the election without any support from other parties, similar to the 2007 local election. However, the 2012 election was more competitive due to the quality of candidates who applied for the election. Other than Fauzi Bowo, the incumbent governor, there was also Alex Noerdin, the governor of South Sumatera. Alex was supported by Golkar and had a good reputation in the province to provide better services for the residents, especially in education and health services. There was also Faisal Basri, a respectable economist and academic, who ran in the election as an independent. Faisal was widely known as young academic in 1998 to join reform movement against Soeharto and joined a party that was established by Amien Rais, an important figure in the process of political change (turbulence sounds negative) in that year. Therefore, he had the image of having brilliant new ideas that may bring changes in Jakarta.
However, among the candidates, Joko Widodo popularly known as Jokowi was a contender who had strong appeal to the voters. He was accompanied by Basuki Tjahaya Purnama, a Chinese business person. Both did not have good education background when compared to Wahid and Fauzi Bowo or Faisal Basri because originally they were active in the business sector. However, both had a dazzling record as mayor and regent in Solo and East Belitung. Jokowi marked good achievement in reforming public services in the city of Solo. Purnama also had a good record during his regency by providing free health service for every resident.
In this aspect, although his personal character is appealing as a welleducated candidate with a good record of humbleness and religiosity, Wahid was unable to attract more votes when compared to what his party garnered. His effort to associate himself with the popular football supporters was also ineffective. It is clear that voters in Jakarta were not significantly affected by ethnic and religious lines. Of course, a candidate such as Fauzi Bowo has influential ties with native people and Islam since he had more votes than Wahid who are equally in incumbency. In the second round, Jokowi was accused of being a nonreligious person by a popular singer to undermine Muslim votes, a campaign that was also circulated in social media. However, this campaign did not have a great impact to Jokowi's electability due to Indonesian voters' growing rationality, especially in Jakarta (Mujani & Liddle 2010) .
POL I T ICA L R ESOURCES
In the local candidacy, as Lieske has mentioned, other factor to play a role for winning local election is the availability to have political resources in the form of incumbency and campaign. If Wahid has the strongest appeal on personal factor, in these he and his team had a quite serious problem compare to other frontrunner candidates. Lack of incumbency and relatively ineffective campaign strategy were quite obvious.
Incumbency
The failure of Wahid's candidacy is also an obvious example of how incumbency is crucial in the aspect of political resources of a candidate. Both Jokowi and Purnama have developed reputations for integrity and good governance in previous elected positions in other regions (Bev 2012) . This kind of reputation was absent for Wahid. His role as the head of People's Consultative Assembly, although nationally recognized, was different from what Jokowi and Purnama had established. As a head of the highest institution in Indonesian political hierarchy, his role is to lead joint session between two branches of parliament. This was a role of managing the session mostly in ceremonial fashion unless there is an effort to amend the Indonesian constitution. Moreover, the joint session was conducted on very limited occasions of the inauguration of the new president and vice president as well as examination of the report from previous president.
As mayor and regent, Jokowi and Purnama had greater chance to conduct activities that were directly related to residents' needs. Jokowi has the reputation of a mayor who was willing to visit every corner of his city to meet residents from different levels or groups. One of his phenomenal achievements was to relocate street sellers that occupied a public place to designated areas. While conflict and clashes are the common consequences of relocation in Indonesian urban areas, Jokowi was able to relocate them peacefully. This happened due to Jokowi's approach to the sellers after 54 times of meeting to discuss and negotiate conditions of the relocation. For the success, Jokowi was invited to present the process in one of the UNON forums in Nigeria on 9 April 2009.
Another candidate, Fauzi Bowo was also an incumbent; while Alex Nurdin was the governor of South Sumatera. Their candidacy has resulted in the highly competitive election in term of incumbency. In this context, it does not necessarily mean incumbency of Jakarta. It refers to the situation that the candidates have served as either governor or mayor or regent in a city or regency. Therefore, it is expected that leadership experience in local context should enhance their electability.
Alex Noerdin was completely embarrassed as his incumbency did not have any impact at all. Wahid had received a better result, but unfortunately, it was not enough to boost his votes. He also failed to defeat Fauzi Bowo who suffered from a negative reception from the Jakartans due to his inability in tackling acute problems of traffic jam and flood as well as ineffective bureaucracy. His lack of real candidacy experience in dealing with urban problems has resulted in low level of votes.
Campaign
For Lieske, the campaign in the examination of candidacy in a local election is based on how much money that a candidate spends. By looking at the campaign expenditures it is likely that the different efforts of each candidate can be evidently examined. It is hypothesized that having much money in an election is measured by the ability to raise more funds to support campaign activities. More funds mean that more leaflets can be distributed and more media coverage can be produced. In short, money can be used to 'buy recognition ' (1989, 155-156) . However, studies related to the significance of funds for the campaign and then winning election have revealed more complex conclusions. It is said that money is more important for the challenger than the incumbent (Jacobson 1978 (Jacobson , 1985 (Jacobson , 1990 as the latter can maximise their service to citizen or constituent during their term in office or Parliament. Therefore, the challenger needs to put more effort to advertise its profile more than the incumbent does (Gerber 1998) . Thus, analyzing the ability to win an election based on candidates' success to raise more fund does not always working straightforward and can be misleading. Although elections in Indonesia are seen as flawed due to the role of money to buy votes before ballot box and after when all votes are counted (Aspinall and Mietzner 2010) , the way candidates market themselves in front of the public is still important in choosing a local leader. In Indonesia, it is noted that it can be diverse from 'pomp' to 'piety' (Lindsay 2009) or 'inter-religious' to 'inter-ethnic' (Aspinall, Dettman, & Warburton 2011, 42-43) . However, there is also a tendency that internet-based media also played significant role alongside the more common campaign modes. Wahid and his success team themselves embraced them too and implemented different types of campaign.
The most common form of a campaign is a public meeting with the mobilisation of hundreds to thousands of cadres and sympathizers in a hall or open space which is quite popular in Indonesian elections, either local and national. All candidates, including Wahid, are still fond of this type of campaign. The PKS that supported him prepared the campaign to develop the image of professionalism dominated by orange and batik design. As usual, this type of PKS campaign was usually attended by thousands of its cadres. The party seemed to understand that this campaign was actually not too effective in reaching the wider public as it was only attended mainly by its cadres. However, the party did it anyway as the main purpose of having an open campaign (parade) was to show the public that the candidate had significant real supporters (can also activate your supporters to get them advocating your candidate in their neighborhoods). It is also for image building when Wahid visited many places in Jakarta in order to get closer to ordinary people as well as community leaders. The traditional market seems to be one of the main targets to visit as Wahid would arrive at the site using traditional vehicles such as becak, cart, or motorcycle mostly with his trademark of orange-colored batik shirt. There are also some occasions that he or his vice candidate attended social activities managed by the party's cadre at the community level including native musical performance. In the recorded activities, he explained his vision to lead Jakarta under the tag of 'Ayo Beresin Jakarta' or 'Let's Settle the Problems of Jakarta.'
Many of his activities were recorded by his volunteer organized PKS TV and then uploaded to YouTube. Perhaps, this is part of their effort to reach the voters through the internet, which is easier to access in the capital and becomes a new strategy in the local elections for all candidates. In conventional theory, it is said that the media endorsement is crucial to the success of the candidate in a local election and it can be analyzed from the report and editorial point of view, or media bias, which can influence the readers (Chiang & Knight 2011) . However, local elections in Indonesia generally have shown different phenomenon as the candidates strived to reach the reader directly. Two different strategies applied by different candidates can be underlined here. They are Internet-based campaign and greeting the voters directly. The first was mainly maximised by Wahid's campaign team as they documented a significant number of Wahid and his running mate's activities in videos and uploaded them on the internet. Varieties of videos were also uploaded to the online video service hoping that his vision and activities could be accessed by internet users. PKS TV has produced approximately 170 short videos and made them available on YouTube. It shows that Wahid's team worked seriously and the party as his support helped him.
However, the videos did not attract significant internet users. Many of them were only hit less than one thousand users and only less than five were watched by ten thousand users. Although this figure is obviously better than what Fauzi Bowo's team did with only less than 30 videos produced by his campaign team and some of them were only watched by less than a hundred, his videos were far less attractive compared to Jokowi's videos in YouTube. Gerindra that supported Purnama, Jokowi's his vice gubernatorial candidate, produced some videos with more sophisticated quality. One of the videos showing his explanation of how he would govern attracted more than a hundred thousand internet users. Compared to Hidayat, Jokowi's explanation about how to tackle problems of congestion was more convincing with concrete proof of similar problem-solving in Solo during his mayorship. His program of health and education service and the way of tackling the ineffectiveness of bureaucracy in the city were also successful. He claimed that he would deterministically fire a bureaucrat not complying with his reform in improving public services. In Solo, many of them had been fired accordingly. As usual, he also showed his calmness and humbleness during the presentation and sometimes he made laughed at his self upon making mistakes.
Similar to Wahid, there were also some videos uploaded to support him and one of them was hit by more than one and half million users after it was available on YouTube on 16 August 2012 (Cameo Project 2012). One of the winners of parody competition produced the highquality video and dedicated for Jokowi. Other than that, the video could represent the feeling of the Jakartans fed up with chronic problems of traffic and corrupt bureaucracy's failure to tackle the city's problems. It is clear that incumbency is not always a positive factors in winning the trust of votes as it may give negative impact for the incumbent to confirm scholars' findings (Anderson & Glomm, 1992) . The mostly Chinese-descendant participants voluntarily developed the video. They even did not know Jokowi before and never met him. According to one of the producers the video was produced as an expression of young people who wanted to have true change in Jakarta. Besides that, they also aimed at endorsing undecided voters to come to the ballot box in the second round (Wibowo, 2012) . Beyond that, there are also several accounts of social media who create account voluntarily to inform about Jokowi. He mentions that on twitter there are @jokowicenter, @jakarta_bangkit, @jbkaskus, @jakartabaru, @relawanmudajakarta, @info-kemeja, @jokowibasuki, @projakarta, and @rumahrelawanJB (Nugroho & Nugroho 2012) .
In attracting middle class who have access to the internet, although Wahid gained support and produced significant numbers of video, Wahid failed to answer what the Jakartans needed during the campaign. Again, attractiveness, message and the ability of a candidate to offer tangible breakthrough to voters are significant. To compare, Jokowi and Purnama's campaign could reach different segment more effectively by using community visit, social media and introduce popular songs and slogans attractive to young voters. The figure below also shows that Jakartans who have access more to the internet were more interested searching for Jokowi than other candidates. Wahid was simply not the candidate to look at by them who were mostly young and middle class. In both campaign periods, for the first and second round, Jokowi always became the first to search on the internet and it was not comparable to others even in the second round when there were only two pairs of candidates. In term of campaign expenditures as Lieske has mentioned, there is no relation between the amounts of fund used to support the campaign with the triumph of the candidate in the 2012 Jakarta election. According to KPU Jakarta, the local election commission, Jokowi as the winner spend 27.05 billion rupiahs for two rounds of the campaign and 16.09 billion rupiahs for his campaign in the first round, 11 July 2012 (Afifah 2012). Compared to Fauzi Bowo, the figure is significantly lower because the incumbent spends 62.57 billion rupiahs for two rounds. Jokowi only spent one billion for programs on TV and radio and most of them were cheap campaigns of direct community visit (Teresia & Ebo 2012) . Jokowi did not like his team producing a huge number of banners since it would mess up public space in Jakarta. Wahid himself spent only 13 billion rupiahs and most of them were collected from the PKS members (Toriq 2012) . For the party, the relatively small amount of funds for a campaign, especially in media, is one of the main reasons for Wahid's failure. Aboe Bakar Al Habsy, one of the Deputy of the PKS explained that, "This is not because of our cadres training or party machine cease working, but it is due to the PKS' financial limitation" (Merdeka.com, 12 July 2012) . Nevertheless, his claim was not entirely accurate by looking at the campaign expenditure of Jokowi and Fauzi Bowo. These figures confirm the previous studies that campaign expenditures are not guaranteeing electoral success. However, the relatively small amount of funds spent by Jokowi and Purnama as challengers is quite unusual. Different variables other than money were surely working in this context.
Wahid's expenditures were not too different from Jokowi's expenditures in the first round although he had arranged many campaign activities, including online media to inform the public about his vision and activities. Despite his efforts, it seems that his campaign was not able to attract significant numbers of Jakartans. However, he still obtained 11 percent of votes showing that there were pockets of votes in favor with his candidacy. One of the answers of this is the ability of the PKS to mobilize its members for election. The PKS is known as the only political party that has been able to mobilize its members to conduct on-political activities to protest bad practices in the country and performs such extra constitutional activities as humanitarian missions (Muhtadi 2012) . Therefore, members in all regions are engaged in electoral tasks to help the party's candidate since the party's member are heavily involved in the electoral process.
One of the best political strategies of the PKS is political canvassing which was proven crucial in winning some of the local elections, particularly in West Java as well as the national election in 2004. It is the strategy that members of a party visit every community household and introduce particular party or candidate for election hoping that the eligible member(s) of the household vote for them. The PKS conducts this strategy in every election either national or local, including the Jakarta election. Party members who conduct this activity are usually trained by the party to develop skills and boost confidence in facing unexpected reaction from the community. They also ask for permission from community leader beforehand so that their presence in a community is legal. During the visit, the party members do not have any obligation to impose their candidate if the person they visit is reluctant. In that case, they only suggest giving a reminder that the election is coming in the following weeks or days and ask her/him to register and vote at the ballot box.
With this kind of approach, there was no guarantee that the person who has been visited by the party's members would automatically agree to vote. In the USA, the effectiveness of this strategy has been widely discussed with mixed conclusion. Some argue that it only gives inconsiderable effects on how voters behave while others explain that it provides more chances to win an election (Gerber & Green 1999) . Although it has an effect on electoral success, it will only apply to certain candidates. Therefore, the party's claim that its political canvassing strategy is part its success in previous elections, national and local, can be easily misleading. It is proven that the strategy cannot boost the electability of Wahid although the PKS has a good record of success in the previous election.
Jokowi's success also confirms that the absence of canvassing as his campaign strategy does not have any correlation with insignificant votes. He and his team implemented community visit rather than household visit and his team uploaded his visit to meet with the com-munity in slum areas promising to improve their neighborhood with the concepts of 'kampong deret' and free health service (KJS). His belief that city development should start from Kampong was more appealing than the idea of other candidates, including Wahid who merely promised to increase the budget for a community without giving concrete program for the extra funds. However, the most influential effect of Jokowi derives from media.
Media Endorsement
As a non-regional leader, Wahid and Rachbini did not have any strong appeal for urban issues and many of their programs were neither attractive nor concrete to be consumed heavily by media. From months before the election, the attention of the media had been focusing on the incumbent and potential contenders such as Alex Noerdin and Faisal Basri. Noerdin even grabbed more attention at the early months prior to the election as he spent more to advertise him at various media (either online, newspaper, or television). Fauzi Bowo then dominated the media afterward by ordering more advertising about him. However, Jokowi became the media favorite just weeks before the first round. His winning as the front-runner at the first round election may well explain the tendency, while the money spent on advertisement contracts is reported higher than others are in the early months (AJI 2012, 57) . Nevertheless, it has to be underlined that the media coverage has given more attention to Jokowi even before his announcement as the candidate from PDIP because of his excellent record as mayor of Solo and a possible move to race for gubernatorial position in Jakarta. Wahid was an immediate candidate after the PKS did not find any agreement with other political parties to support candidate together. As a result, media attention was relatively minimal when compared to others. It is reflected in the findings of a research conducted by AJI revealing that he only recorded over 300 news of him. This figure is relatively low when compared to that of Jokowi (nearly 700) and Fauzi Bowo (more than 500) (56).
Jokowi had become a political star in Solo. As a mayor, he had recorded many achievements that had been impossibly achieved by other mayors. His ability to relocate street sellers without any conflict has amazed the public and the winning record of 91 percent for his second period as mayor confirms this as well. He has also a lot of creative ideas to tackle the problems in Solo that may become the alternative leadership to other regions. With this success and public expectation for alternative leadership, media captured this opportunity and broadcast him more after the momentum of his announcement to use a car produced by Indonesian mechanical secondary school as mayor official car.
Starting from his brave announcement about the local product preference, he turned into a public figure and even political celebrity. A social analyst for ICG wrote that 'He may not be a Jakartan but there is no politician Indonesian broadcasters love more than the telegenic Jokowi, who in his trademark of the checked shirt is comfortably talking with people in slums and vocal in fighting corruption' (Sukarsono 2012) . As a consequence, the public is also driven by the media coverage to accept his achievement. Mietzner has a similar impression for Jokowi that it is a combination of a creative campaign team to use popular culture and intensive coverage by media and it has increased his popularity in Jakarta (Sambhi 2013) .
According to Nugroho (2012) , the intensive coverage is related to uniquely distinctive character and approach of Jokowi in the politics of Indonesia. His uniqueness has attracted is attractive to media to have news on him. After his inauguration as governor the coverage went on and some of his meetings led by him or by vice governor can reach more than a million of hits in social media. Journalists competed for each other to follow him every day to have a headline about him.
Media effect is quite powerful in deciding the fate of the competition because his contenders, Fauzi Bowo and Wahid are having different space and perception in the media. Fauzi Bowo was perceived as a failed governor as he was unable to solve the frustrating problems in Jakarta. His magic word of 'give it to the expert' in undermining Adang Daradjatun, a vice police chief, in the local election of 2007 had turned against him after five years in office. Fauzi Bowo's 'rigid style and distanced relation to the people' (Yew-Foong & Bhakti 2012) had made him unpopular for media and the right angle to cover him as the incumbent was his inability to build better Jakarta. His style was also difficult to reach young voters and those who were more technologically savvy in the social media, a strategy that was admitted as his weakness. Wahid also had a problem in front of the media. Although he and his success team have strived to develop an image that fitted with his and his vice candidate credential, he was not at the center of media coverage. It was always between Fauzi Bowo and Jokowi (AJI 2012).
CONCLUSION
The nomination of Hidayat Nur Wahid in the 2012 Jakarta election was an immediate decision by the PKS. He and his party only had one month to make preparation which later had to be altered to support a different candidate. This has put the party in a difficult situation to develop a suitable and convincing appeal to the Jakartans. The party depended greatly on his personal reputation as a religious and humble person who obtained a doctorate degree in Islamic Studies from Madinah. He is known as a respectable person and relatively popular among Indonesian public after serving as the head of People's Consultative Assembly. Among other candidates, only Fauzi Bowo has the similar overseas degree.
This aspect of legitimacy for the candidate in the local election seems to be the only legitimate variable that Wahid has. He lacked two other factors to be the real contender: political resources and media coverage. He had insufficient sources to convince the voters of the gubernatorial position as he had no experience in local politics and dealing with issues in urban politics. In the campaign, he strived to position himself as a person for all by maximising symbols of color and batik. He seemed to minimise the usage of Islamic symbols as he thought his personality as Muslim was already in the public's mind. However, his and the party's effort to penetrate plural communities in Jakarta, beyond identity lines, did not work very well due to the growing rationality of the voters. He and his campaign team were unable to be more popular by maximising popular culture and creative approach. Many of the videos produced by the party's media team were old fashioned and he was not interested in media coverage to increase his popularity forcing his team to depend on canvassing. The latter strategy seemed to be effective to penetrate members of the community but its effectiveness to change voter behavior is doubtful both in theory and practice.
It is also important to note that the pattern of communication used by candidates has changed significantly. Conventional media was not the only medium for the voters to get information as there is a tendency to use direct communication strategy through online media, social media, or face-to-face meeting. Wahid and Rachbini campaign team had taken optimal efforts to utilize this media. However, their conventional approach during community visit and their uploaded videos were not attractive. Likewise, Fauzi Bowo suffered the similar fate as Jokowi has maximised his popularity as mayor of Solo and his humble but effective campaign strategy.
Jakarta local election confirms that the figure of a candidate does still matters. However, a particular figure is more important than others. For such Islamic parties as the PKS, having a strong personal character in term of religiosity and positive behavior based on religious values is inadequate. An anti-corruption as depicted by the Islamic party is not attractive enough since there is no evidence that personal honesty will also be effective in improving local bureaucracy and solving the problems in the city. Experience, in particular, previous success, and expectation are partly influential as shown by Jokowi, a variable absent in Wahid and Rachbini. In short, unless Islamic parties are able to offer a candidate with a capacity to tackle urban problems it seems that urban votes are highly unlikely to be on their side, although they share the similar religious identity.
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